Defrost Mode
Blast RadiusOne night in October, the freezers in hundreds of French supermarkets switched themselves into defrost and set their thermostats to fifty degrees, and three weeks later the same thing happened in stores from Belgium and the Netherlands to Sweden, Ireland and Estonia. Nobody touched a fridge: the controllers that run them were reachable from the open internet, many of them on old software and some past the end of their life, and defrost, an ordinary maintenance setting, became the weapon. Julian Ashcroft works the case of Europe's supermarket refrigeration attacks: the two nights, the technicians pulling installations off the network in the small hours, what France says it found, and why a freezer ever needed a web page.
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Official sources
- CERT-FR alert CERTFR-2026-ALE-012: attacks on refrigeration controllers (French)
- CERT-FR report CERTFR-2026-CTI-009 (French)
- France's foreign ministry: attribution of the cyberattacks to Iran (French)
- CISA advisory ICSA-26-057-10
Reporting
- BleepingComputer: cyberattack shuts down refrigerators at French supermarkets
- The Register: cyberattacks crank French supermarket refrigeration up to 50C
- Al Jazeera: unprecedented cyberattack hits French supermarkets
- BFMTV: the temperature rose to 50 degrees (French)
- BleepingComputer: hackers disrupt refrigeration systems at European supermarkets
- The Register: Frozen part II, hackers remotely defrost produce in Euro supermarkets again
- Al Jazeera: freezers in Sweden and Belgium overheat after possible cyberattacks
- RTL: Belgian stores hit (French)
- TV4: fridges and freezers knocked out in ICA stores (Swedish)
- Cybersecurity Dive: European authorities probe attacks on grocery refrigerators
- BleepingComputer: FBI and CISA warn of attacks on refrigeration systems
- BleepingComputer: France blames Iranian hackers for supermarket attacks that sparked fires
- The Register: France's attribution
- Cooling Post: cyber attacker targets refrigeration plant
- Infosecurity Magazine: cyberattacks on supermarket refrigeration
Julian Ashcroft
0:01 It's just past one in the morning, on the second of November, and somewhere in Belgium the technicians of a refrigeration installer are doing the one thing nobody in their trade ever wants to do. They are pulling their own installations off the network, one by one, as fast as their hands will go.
Engineer
0:26 Next store. Take it offline. Don't wait for the readings, just cut it off.
Julian Ashcroft
0:32 Far to the north, in a supermarket in Sweden, the freezers have been told it's time to defrost, and the temperature setting reads plus fifty degrees.
Engineer
0:45 Set it back. It won't take it. It just won't take it.
Julian Ashcroft
0:51 Nobody has opened a door, and nobody has touched a fridge, but in one store the cooling system has started to make heat. By four, store managers in Belgium are reading warnings by text message, and some of them are calling in refrigerated trucks to save what's left. And the part this whole case turns on is that none of it is new.
1:19 It has happened before, three weeks ago, in France.
Nora Whitfield
1:25 I'm Nora Whitfield. Before we begin... one honest disclosure. Everything in this story is real.
1:33 The company, the timeline, the numbers. All of it happened, and all of it comes from the public record. The voice about to tell it to you... is not real.
1:44 Neither is mine. We are synthetic... generated with AI. The facts are human.
1:51 The reconstruction is ours.
Julian Ashcroft
1:53 I'm Julian Ashcroft, and I'm your narrator. This is Blast Radius... stories from the nights our systems failed... and the people who brought them back.
2:07 This is a true story. Tonight there's no single company in the dock. The victims are supermarket chains across Europe, from Leclerc, Intermarché and Coopérative U in France to Carrefour, Spar and Coop in Belgium and Sweden, and the system is the small box on the wall of a plant room that runs their fridges and freezers.
2:32 It's a refrigeration controller, and many of these, from makers like Danfoss, Copeland and Dixell, came with a web page so a technician could check the temperatures from anywhere. Anywhere turned out to include the open internet. On the night of the eleventh of October, someone reached those web pages and told the freezers in French stores to defrost, with their setpoints near fifty degrees.
3:01 Early reports said a few hundred stores were hit, and the French government later put it at about seven hundred sites, with at least fifteen fires. Three weeks later it happened again, this time in Belgium, Luxembourg, Sweden, Ireland and Estonia at least.
3:20 France says it knows who was behind the first night. So far, nobody has said who was behind the second.
System
3:28 Incident declared. Start the clock.
Julian Ashcroft
3:34 Let's go back to an ordinary day, before either night, and start with the box on the wall. In the back of a supermarket, behind the aisles, there's a plant room full of compressors and pipework, and a controller that decides how cold every display case and every freezer should be. It holds the setpoints, the alarms and the defrost schedule, and in a big store it watches dozens of units at once.
4:04 Defrost is the most ordinary thing it does. Ice builds up on the coils inside a freezer, so every so often the controller warms them for a while to clear it, and then the cold comes back. It's maintenance, built in, and it runs on its own without anyone thinking about it.
Engineer
4:25 Frozen aisle's holding. Dairy's fine. Defrost cycles look normal. Nothing to drive out for tonight.
Julian Ashcroft
4:36 That's the convenience the web page was built for. The people who look after these systems, at installers and at service providers that manage refrigeration for whole chains, can check a store from a laptop instead of a van. Some stores sit inside a chain's central network, and others are run by independent operators with refrigeration systems of their own.
5:01 When Sweden's ICA later described the stores it lost, its press officer put it this way.
Record
5:08 Affecting a small number of ICA stores operating outside ICA's central network.
Julian Ashcroft
5:15 Now here's the fault, and it has been sitting in plain sight for years. Many of those web pages didn't only answer the technician. They answered anyone on the open internet who went looking. Many of the controllers ran older versions of their software, and some were past the end of their life, with no more updates coming at all.
5:39 France's computer emergency team would later say it plainly in its alert: in general, exposing a management interface on the internet goes against good practice. And it wasn't a handful of boxes. The day after the first night, a security researcher counted two thousand seven hundred and fifty-two Danfoss systems exposed online, fifteen hundred and ninety of them in France, and the Shodan search engine was tracking more than forty-five hundred Danfoss devices reachable from anywhere.
6:14 Sweden's national cybersecurity centre would say it had already flagged a lot of exposed operational equipment in the country, equipment that needed updating or patching. So the warning existed, and the boxes were still there, humming in plant rooms across Europe. And on every one of those web pages, among the alarms and the temperatures, sat the setting that would become the weapon, and it was the most ordinary one on the page.
6:48 It was the switch that tells a freezer it's time to defrost. The first night was a Sunday, the eleventh of October, in France. Overnight, someone reached refrigeration controllers in supermarkets that were running older versions of Danfoss control software, and they didn't need to break anything at all.
7:11 They used the units'own built-in defrost and set the targets near fifty degrees.
Engineer
7:19 Temperature alarm, frozen aisle. And the dairy case. They're all in defrost.
Commander
7:27 All of them at once? That's not a schedule. Who changed the setpoints?
Engineer
7:33 Nobody here. The controller says fifty, and it's climbing.
Julian Ashcroft
7:41 By Monday morning some of the biggest names in French retail were confirming the damage, and France would later list Casino, Leclerc, Coopérative U, Metro, Carrefour and Intermarché among the victims. Intermarché's spokesperson gave the first account of how the attack got in.
Record
8:01 Following a cyberattack reportedly affecting a service provider that manages refrigeration systems in stores, some fresh and frozen food display units are out of service.
Julian Ashcroft
8:13 Intermarché and Netto pulled the products from those units as fast as they could. The president of Coopérative U confirmed that since the night before, an attack had been hitting refrigeration in several of the group's stores, and he described the response like this.
Record
8:31 Our teams are fully mobilized, working alongside refrigeration specialists, to resolve the situation as quickly as possible.
Julian Ashcroft
8:39 Then he said what the whole trade was thinking.
Record
8:44 Targeting equipment essential for preserving fresh produce and supplying food to the French people is an extremely serious matter and is unprecedented. It is unacceptable.
Julian Ashcroft
8:56 That same Monday, France's computer emergency team, CERT-FR, published its alert. It said it knew of numerous compromises of remote controllers for refrigeration installations, naming the Danfoss AK-SM and AK-SC series and Copeland and Dixell xweb.
9:17 Its advice was blunt: cut them off the internet, check the whole configuration, especially the defrost schedules, and bring access back only through a secure VPN or a protected network. The Paris prosecutor's office opened an investigation, and it told the news agency AFP what that investigation was for.
Record
9:42 Identify the victims and establish the link with the damage they reported in terms of foodstuff losses and the outbreak of fires.
Julian Ashcroft
9:51 Fires, from a fridge. France would later count at least fifteen of them. On the thirteenth, CERT-FR added more targeted equipment to its alert, and on the sixteenth it updated its advice again.
10:08 Two lines in that update read like a forecast. Attack campaigns against these controllers, it warned, were probably still under way, and for end-of-life units left on the open internet a factory reset alone wasn't enough, because the equipment would stay vulnerable and would almost certainly be compromised again.
Commander
10:31 So we wipe it clean, and it's wide open again the next morning.
Julian Ashcroft
10:36 Three weeks later, on the night of the first of November, the forecast came true. So who did the trade suspect first? On any normal night, a warm freezer means a tired compressor or a stuck valve. But one store failing is a breakdown, and hundreds failing on the same night is something else entirely.
11:03 The next suspect was a supplier. Intermarché said the attack had reportedly hit a service provider that manages refrigeration in its stores. But in the second wave, the Colruyt Group described the Spar shops it lost like this.
Record
11:23 These stores are operated by independent entrepreneurs who have their own refrigeration systems.
Julian Ashcroft
11:29 Sweden's ICA said much the same about its own stores, the ones running outside its central network, so a single provider couldn't explain it all. As for Ahold Delhaize, it had taken some systems offline after an incident of its own back in October, and its page said there was no evidence yet of any link to France.
Commander
11:54 And it wasn't anyone on shift. Nobody here touched a setpoint.
Julian Ashcroft
12:00 And yes, before you ask. Was it DNS? It was not DNS. The second night didn't stay in one country.
12:13 Before dawn on the second of November, the reports came in from Belgium, Luxembourg, Sweden, Ireland and Estonia at least, and the count of stores differed from one outlet to the next. In Belgium and Luxembourg, dozens of Ahold Delhaize stores saw their temperatures climb overnight, and a refrigeration company said the evaporators had been switched to defrost.
Engineer
12:40 I've reset this one twice. It goes straight back into defrost.
Commander
12:46 Then stop resetting it. Pull it off the network.
Julian Ashcroft
12:51 That was the wrong fix the trade kept learning the hard way. CERT-FR had already warned that a reset wouldn't hold on an exposed, end-of-life unit, and the director of a Belgian installer said a software update alone couldn't protect these boxes either, because they needed physical changes too.
13:12 In Ireland, SuperValu took chilled and frozen products off the shelves in thirteen stores. In Sweden, freezers at an Axfood distribution centre near Gothenburg were hit, and at one ICA store the setting sat at plus fifty and would not change back, so the frozen food was thrown away.
13:33 Carrefour in Belgium counted fifteen stores hit, and kept every one of them open. The EU's agriculture and food commissioner put the cost in plain words.
Record
13:47 Europe's food supply chain must be prepared for new and evolving threats. The repeated cyber-attacks on supermarkets are deeply concerning, causing economic losses for retailers and empty shelves for consumers.
Julian Ashcroft
14:02 And Belgium's cybersecurity centre said the thing nobody on shift wanted to hear, that the attackers may never be identified.
Commander
14:13 So who's next?
Julian Ashcroft
14:16 So far, nobody could say. Here's the root cause, and it was never the freezer. It was the web page. A box built to keep food cold was answering anyone on the open internet who went looking, and many of those boxes ran older software, some of them past the end of their life, with no more updates coming.
14:41 Nobody needed to break anything. Whoever reached those pages used the most ordinary setting on them, the defrost the controller runs on its own every day, and gave it a target near fifty degrees. At one store in Sweden the setting sat at plus fifty and would not change back.
15:02 That's why the resets kept failing. Wipe an exposed, end-of-life unit clean and it's still sitting on the internet, still vulnerable, and, as CERT-FR warned, almost certainly compromised again. The only fix that held was the one those technicians in Belgium were doing at one in the morning: take the box off the open internet, and let people back in only through a secure VPN or a protected network.
15:31 So the freezers never broke down. They did exactly what they were told. What failed was who they would take orders from. By sunrise on the second of November, the recovery looked less like engineering and more like housekeeping.
15:52 Spoiled food went into the bins, refrigerated trucks stood behind the stores, and the boxes the technicians had cut off the network stayed off it. Across the trade, the fix that held wasn't a clever patch. It was a connection taken away.
16:12 In Belgium, the director of a refrigeration company told the broadcaster RTL that a software update alone couldn't protect these units, and that most of his clients had already moved to a secure connection after the French attacks. He put the lesson in one line.
Record
16:32 The simplest solution is to manage the refrigerators via a secure internet connection.
Julian Ashcroft
16:39 Then the authorities caught up. On the third of November, the European Commission held emergency meetings with ENISA and Europol, and a controller maker confirmed that some of its web controllers had been targeted. Britain's cybersecurity centre said it knew of a couple of cases in its own food supply chain and had alerted the companies that might be affected.
17:04 In the United States, the FBI and CISA warned of attacks on refrigeration and cold-chain systems worldwide. On the ninth of November, France said who it blames for its night. According to France, the October wave was the work of a unit linked to Iran's Revolutionary Guards. It says the same infrastructure was used to scout industrial equipment at small energy and water plants, and that its investigators found traces of Farsi in it.
17:39 The foreign ministry said it would summon Iran's ambassador and propose new EU sanctions, and it described the campaign like this.
Record
17:48 This is an unprecedented campaign in terms of its scale and level of aggressiveness, thus constituting the first cyber offensive campaign carried out purely for the purpose of sabotage on national territory.
Julian Ashcroft
18:03 That is France's accusation, and it covers October only. So far, nobody has said who was behind the second night. But this show doesn't sentence people, it sentences systems, and the action items hardly depend on whose hands were on the keys.
18:24 Take every management page off the open internet, and bring access back only through a secure VPN or a protected network. Check the whole configuration, not just the temperatures, and above all the defrost schedules, because a schedule someone else wrote will run on its own. Treat an end-of-life controller as a box with no future, since CERT-FR warned that a reset only puts it back in front of the same open door.
18:52 And plan for the night the cold stops, because the Commission said it would look at exactly that: retailers'contingency plans and their ability to respond.
Commander
19:03 So nobody on shift goes in the report.
Julian Ashcroft
19:07 Nobody does. The report names a web page that should never have faced the open internet, and the most ordinary setting on it, which nobody ever thought of as dangerous. It wasn't the freezers, which did exactly what they were told.
19:25 It wasn't the technicians, who spent the small hours pulling their own installations off the network. And it wasn't some exotic trick, because nobody needed to break anything: they used the defrost the controller already had. It was a management page that answered anyone on the open internet, on boxes running older software, some of them past the end of their life, with the most ordinary setting in the trade sitting on it like a loaded switch.
19:57 So here's the one thing to take back to your own shift. Somewhere in the systems you look after, there's a box that went online for convenience and that nobody has looked at in years, a camera, a badge reader, a controller in a plant room. Find it before someone else does, take it off the open internet, and let people back in only through a secure VPN or a protected network.
20:27 And when it misbehaves, don't trust a reset to save you, because a box wiped clean behind an open door is still sitting behind that door. So. The verdict.
System
20:41 Incident resolved. Stop the clock.
Julian Ashcroft
20:45 ... Sleep with your pager on... This story was built from the public record: CERT-FR's alert on the refrigeration controllers, statements from the retailers and from France's foreign ministry, and reporting from BleepingComputer, The Register, Reuters, Al Jazeera, AFP, Cybersecurity Dive and the trade paper Cooling Post.
21:10 Links, timestamps, and sources are in the show notes. It's a story that's still moving. Our sources run to the tenth of November, so when you heard "so far" tonight, we meant exactly that.
21:27 Some of the numbers, from how many stores were hit to how many countries, still differ from one account to the next. Tonight's voices were Nora Whitfield and me, Julian Ashcroft, both synthetic, reading a reconstruction of real events.
21:46 We named no engineer, technician or store worker, because the culprit was the system, not the people who spent the night saving what they could. Blast Radius is an AllTuner Originals production.